The provisions of the Limitation Act for computation of the period of limitation in the case of persons under legal disability
If the legal representative also suffers from minority, insanity or idiocy at the time of the death of the person whom he represents will also be governed by the rules contained in sub-sections (1) and (2) of section 6.
Where a person under disability, dies after the cessation of such disability, but before the expiry of the period allowed to him under Sec. 6, his legal representative may institute the suit or make the application within the same period after the death of his predecessor-in interest as would otherwise have been available to that person had he not died.
The reason why persons under disability are not subject to the ordinary rule of limitation is that law considers them incapable of forming a proper judgment as to bringing suits or otherwise managing their own affairs.
It should be clearly understood that no disqualification other than those mentioned in the section viz. minority, insanity, or idiocy can save limitation under the Act and according to the explanation to Sec. 6 ‘minor’ includes a child in the womb. It should also be noted that the section applies only to suits (suits other than pre-emption) and application for execution of decrees and does not apply to appeals.
Section 7, which is a supplement to Sec. 6, enacts that where legal relation to each other of several persons who are jointly entitled to institute a suit or file an application for execution of a decree is such, that one of them who is free from disability can give a full discharge of the whole claim or debt without waiting for the concurrence of others whether those others are or are not free from disability, then the minority, insanity or idiocy will not entitle him or his co-plaintiffs to the extension of any time under section 6.
The peculiar feature of this provision is that limitation under it is extended or not with reference to the entire body of persons jointly entitled to sue or make an application for execution of a decree. The extension of limitation does not take place with reference to the person under disability alone.
Section 7, like the preceding section 6, is confined to suits and application for execution of decrees by persons under disability. It does not apply to appeals. It also does not apply to enforce right of pre-emption. It has now been made clear by Explanation 1 to Section 7 that this section applies to a discharge from every kind of liability, including a liability in respect of any immovable property.
In case of a Mitakshara joint Hindu Family its manager can give a valid discharge without the concurrence of other members of the family provided he is in the management of the joint family property.
According to first part of section 8 suits for pre-emption are not governed by sections 6 and 7 of the Act and in spite of the disability, they must be proceeded with and no extension of time will be given an account of the disability of the plaintiff.
The second portion of the section says that a person under disability may sue after cessation of the disability within the same period as he would otherwise have been allowed under the schedule but in no case can the period be extended to anything beyond 3 years from the cessation of the disability.
It is not to be understood that a person under disability will be entitled to the full period of limitation prescribed for a suit or application, computed from the date of the cessation of the disability. The law allows only the prescribed period of limitation computed from the cessation of the disability provided that if such period exceeds 3 years, he is not entitled to the full period, but only 3 years from the date of the rescission of the disability.
But if the ordinary period of limitation computed from the original accrual of the cause of action expires more than three years after the cessation of the disability, such period will be allowed.
When once time has begun to run, on subsequent disability or inability to institute a suit or make an application stops it. This applies to a person himself as well as to his representatives- in-interest after his death. (S. 9). The joint effect of Sec. 9 and previous sections is that if advantage is taken of two disabilities they must so overlap each other as to leave no gap of normal
period between them, i.e., period which is free from all disabilities because as soon as such an interval occurs, the time begins to run and subsequent inability or disability is powerless to stop its running.